Ukraine, Donbass, and CrimeaUkraine has been a pressure point, or a geopolitical pivot, to quote Zbigniew Brzezinski, used against Russia since 1991. Indeed, some analysts would argue that this strategy goes back to relying on Galician Banderites in various capacities after the Second World War. Because working with that country’s corrupt elites had not been difficult, Washington alone officially invested $5 billion into the creation of the so-called civil society, that is, an entire class of opinion-makers and media personalities hostile to the country’s historic roots and heritage shared with Russia. Using Ukraine as project anti-Russia was not only meant to cordon Russia off from the European Union, but also to damage much of the trade and manufacturing sectors that have been historically oriented toward each other since these were republics within the USSR.

However, the West-backed regime change was imperfect, since the majority-Russian and autonomous republic of Crimea, strategically positioned on the Black Sea, reunited with Russia through a referendum. At the same time, majority-Russian Donbass held massive protests, which the Kiev government, with the financial and military backing of its Western supporters, has been trying to crush for over a year and a half. The war has not only been used as an informational weapon against Russia. It also led to economic sanctions, described below, and an ongoing financial drain through the influx of over a million refugees, making it a top asylum destination, not to mention the necessary and ongoing deliveries of humanitarian aid.
Yet, the Minsk-2 agreements—guaranteed by Russia, France, and Germany—had minimized the scale of fighting, if not bringing about full peace. This left the Ukrainian government and its Washington backers both with less reasons to justify the ongoing economic collapse domestically, that could no longer be written off by war, and with less options of using project Ukraine against Russia. Thus came the Crimean blockade, damaging Ukrainian businesses more than the peninsula itself, and the terrorist act of blowing up the electric pylons by Ukrainian ‘nationalists’, as the government tacitly stood by—despite Russia’s regular gas deliveries all last winter. This act left 2 million Crimeans, and hundreds of thousands of Ukraine’s own citizens, in the dark for days.
To complicate matters further, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) changed its rules in order to continue lending to Ukraine, as the country was on the verge of default. The Fund’s game changer, in part, excused not paying back Kiev’s debts to Moscow; later, however, the IMF confirmed that the debt was sovereign. This won’t improve the situation for average Ukrainians, but it is largely a tool to pressure Russia. This decision on the part of IMF—to which the U.S. is the biggest contributor at 72%—came virtually at the same time as the U.S. Vice President Joe Biden visited Ukraine for the fourth time since the regime change in 2014 for another round of consultations.
Some Russian commentators have joked that the invisible hand of the market changed the market rules. IMF once again definitely proved that it is not an economic, but a political instrument. It also delegitimized itself by showing that it has one set of rules for Greece and Portugal, and another—for Ukraine. Of course, while Kiev’s currently discussed debt to Moscow is $3 billion, since 1991, Russia had given that country financial aid in various forms totalling somewhere between $200 and $300 billion. The European Union, in turn, had provided around $19 billion. Much of that money ended up in the pockets of the oligarchs, Bloomberg admitted.
Economic Sanctions, Ruble, and EnergyCrimean reunification with Russia and war in Ukraine—both the result of the West’s own actions—have been used as a pretext to punish Russia through sanctions, or, rather, unilateral economic measures. The term “sanctions,” is, of course, a misnomer, since only the United Nations Security Council can issue them. The purpose of these economic measures was to lower the standard of living for average citizens, scare the elites, thereby creating social unrest and, in time, change the country’s leadership to someone more pliable.
These measures were issued by the United States and the European Union, along with a number of other countries like Canada, targeting economic, defense, and energy sections, as well as individuals. Certain Russian companies are no longer able to rely on Western credit—a measure designed specifically in light of this country’s aforementioned dependence on the Liberal economic model. Indeed, Joe Biden admitted to having pressured Europe into implementing them. And, the EU was reluctant to engage, considering that, as expected, these measures later caused substantial economic damage to individual countries in the Union. Next, sanctions have been renewed under false pretext of fulfilling Minsk-2 agreements on Ukraine, to which Russia is not a party, but a guarantor. Indeed, they may stay in place for decades: those issuing them only choose to remove them when they see no desired effect and, indeed, prolonged damage to themselves, as was the case with China.
In addition, the ruble fell substantially, in part, as a result of the dropping oil price. We should note that the U.S. economy is also hurt by this. Some have suggested that what is now a competition between Russia and Saudi Arabia is based on oil-price manipulation by the latter. One of the major factors at play here is that these two countries are at war for the Chinese market.
However, Russia is not a ‘gas station‘ of a nation that certain commentators would like to think. Its oil and gas exports have not exceeded 16% of the GDP. Of course, the situation is more complex, as this number does not include related industries. Nonetheless, it is the oil price, not sanctions that have negatively affected Russia’s economy, some Western experts say.
They also admit that Russia is in better shape economically than Barack Obama’s statement about leaving it “in tatters.” Indeed, inflation may translate into greater exports for Russia, and economic restructuring of the domestic market in order to replace banned goods may benefit the country’s own producers. If Putin’s estimates are to be believed, the situation is nowhere near ideal, but the worst of the crisis is over. Most important, the greatest reason for the so-called sanctions—to cause domestic discord—seems to have failed, as the president’s ratings remain high thanks to rallying the nation behind him.
The creation of an artificial rift between Russia and the European Union—constantly maintained through media tools—is beneficial to Washington. Russia and the EU are trading partners in various fields beyond energy resources. But energy is of great significance: the U.S. plans delivery of liquefied gas to Europe in 2016, and is pushing Russia out of the market that it dominates. Indeed, certain countries in the EU are undermining the Nord Stream-2 project, effectively trying to force Russia into continued dependence on Ukraine for transit purposes.
It is also not coincidental that U.S. think tanks like Stratfor list disrupting the union between Germany and Russia as one of Washington’s key strategic goals: German industry and technology and Russia’s resources, as in classic geopolitics, would create a powerhouse of an alliance and challenge Washington’s hegemony. Neither is it coincidental that the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)—the negotiations for which had been shrouded by mystery as far as the public is concerned—is a protectionist measure by the United States also created to eliminate competition, such as China and Russia. The same applies to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the protectionist trading bloc in Asia. So much for the proponents of the free market.
Turkey, Middle East, and TerrorismThe complex situation in the Middle East is akin to a multi-layered cake, in which geopolitical rivalries are entangled with regional interests and religious disagreements. There are several centers of power, including the U.S., Israel, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Iran. As of recent, this list extended to Russia with its legal engagement in combatting terrorism in Syria—including hundreds of its own citizens, who joined Daesh (‘Islamic State’) and could come home— and defending its own regional interests in the Caspian. We must not underestimate the extent to which certain Middle Eastern countries are capable of acting as autonomous players, despite their alliances with Washington in various formats, as the case of Turkey’s entry into Iraq—that does not necessarily work for the U.S.—indicates.
Considering that it is Turkey, with which Russia is experiencing an open confrontation following the downing of its SU-24 bomber, let us focus on on it. The neo-Ottoman aspirations of Recep Erdogan’s government are limited by political realities of the region, where Turkey does have the ability to exert substantial influence, military and otherwise, on Iraq and Syria in light of their respective weakened, war-torn status.
Turkey’s relationship with Russia has been amicable only in the last decade, primarily for economic reasons, following a history of numerous wars, most of which Turkey, or the Ottoman Empire, lost. Russia’s involvement in the Syrian conflict upon that government’s invitation undermined both the Turkish expansionist aspirations and the terrorist oil trade across the Syrian border, particularly when Putin publicized some of the data implicating G20 member states in none other than Antalya. Mere days after this revelation came the downing of Russia’s SU-24 bomber over Syria. Of course, there is also precedent of Turkey allowing known terrorists from Russia’s North Caucasus to receive medical treatment and training.

Nor is Turkey the only state in the region with links to terrorism. Analysts have alleged that both the incredibly wealthy Qatar and Saudi Arabia are state sponsors of terrorism and exporters of Wahhabism—of particular relevance to the Syrian conflict and beyond. This makes their participation in the illegal U.S.-led coalition against Daesh and their massive entanglements in Europe rather eyebrow-raising, much like Saudi-Arabia’s own recently launched Islamic anti-terrorist group.
What today’s official Turkey has in common with post-regime-change Ukraine is its superior geostratetic position that, as of recent, both countries have been selling to the highest bidder as an anti-Russian platform. We, the general public, will likely never learn—perhaps, from an official’s memoirs years from now—the exact details of Turkey’s provocation with Russia’s bomber and the subsequent murder of one of its pilots in Syria by the son of a Turkish ex-mayor and Grey Wolves member. Cui bono is a more difficult question than it may appear.
On the one hand, a major disagreement between Turkey and Russia benefits Washington by having their respective attention directed and energy wasted toward a growing disagreement with each other, such as the embargo implemented by Russia or its cancellation of visa-free travel. One of the most significant components here is the Turkish Stream project—after tiny Bulgaria was brought to heel with the abandonment of planned South Stream—threatening the Washington-led order by maintaining Russia’s energy supplies into continental Europe. Undermining Turkish Stream helps other energy-supply routes, like the Trans-Anatolian, Trans-Adriatic and other pipelines connecting Middle East—Saudia Arabia and Qatar—to Europe through Azerbaijan and Turkey, thus checking both Russia and Iran. It is no coincidence that shortly following Turkish PM Ahmet Davutoglu’s visit to Baku—who said that Azerbaijan could participate in joint energy projects if Armenia withdraws from ‘occupied’ lands—Azerbaijan shelled Nagorno-Karabakh for the first time since the 1994 ceasefire.
And Washington has many ways of pressuring Turkey. Suggestions of domestic instability by using the Kurd factor would certainly be taken seriously from those who have orchestrated many color revolutions. Most important, it is doubtful that Turkey, a NATO member, would have carried out such a brazen act—the first downing of a Russian (Soviet) military plane in 60 years—without having any communication with the organization.
On the other hand, Turkey is a major regional power with its current leadership sharing neo-Ottoman aspirations, as mentioned above. Its strategically excellent position, over the old Byzantine Empire, between Europe and the Middle East, controlling the straits and, more recently, the refugee influx into Europe, give it major bargaining power—3 billion euros from the EU, to be exact. During the Cold War, this country used its geostratetic position for housing Jupiters, American nuclear weapons, against the Soviet Union. The aforementioned energy-transit projects, including checking Russia and Iran, are, of course, beneficial to Turkey itself.
Currently, its NATO membership makes the Erdogan government feel protected to act as it wishes. Indeed, NATO’s initial reaction to the downing of SU-24 was ambiguous. Yet, that things did not work out quite as hoped is obvious from the incident, in which a Russian destroyer fired warning shots at an approaching Turkish fishing vessel in Greek waters, after communication attempts failed, no doubt reminded of USS Cole bombing. This failed provocation—following the revelation about its terrorist-oil links in Syria and the plane downing—is a sign that Turkey is trying to change its perception in the West to that of a victim.
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